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FEDERALISM AND SUPRANATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. Patterns for 
New Legal Structures. By Peter Hay. Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press. 1966. Pp. 385. $7.50. 
Few other events of legal significance have received as much re-
cent attention in American law reviews as has the establishment of 
the three European Communities. In sheer volume, the American 
literature dealing with these supranational organizations probably 
exceeds all that has been written about them in the six Member States 
of the Communities. Yet, until the publication of the book under 
review, one topic-the nature of Community law and its relation to 
the domestic law of the Member States-has received relatively little 
attention in the United States.1 On the other side of the Atlantic, by 
contrast, it has generated an intense scholarly debate.2 We now have 
I. For the most valuable American studies, see Buxbaum, Incomplete Federalism: 
Jurisdiction Over Antitrust .Matters in the European Economic Community, 52 CAuF. 
L. REv. 56 (1964); Stein, Toward Supremacy of Treaty-Constitution by Judicial Fiat: 
On the Margin of the Costa Case, 63 l\!Icu. L. REv. 491 (1965). 
2. For the most recent symposia on this subject, see BRUGES, CoLI.Jl:GE D'EUROPE, DROIT 
CoMMUNAUTAIRE ET DROIT NATIONAL (Semaine de Bruges) (1965); ZUR INTEGRATION Eu-
JlOPAS (Hallstein &: Schlochauer eds. 1965); Aktuelle Fragen des europaischen Gemein-
schaftsreclits, 29 .ABHANDLUGEN AUS DEii{ BiiRGERLICBEN RECHT, HANDELSRECHT UND 
'\VIRTSCHAFI'SRECHT (Beiheft der ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DAS GESAMTE HANDELSRECHT UND 
WIRTSCHAFI'SRECHT 1965). 
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in Professor Hay's study a brilliantly searching and most comprehen-
sive analysis of this subject. It is a scholarly achievement of first rank 
that is marred only by a syntax which is at times almost inscrutable. 
Many of the problems which Professor Hay considers in his book 
have become of considerable practical importance in recent years. 
These problems have arisen primarily because Community law is in-
creasingly affecting, and in some areas gradually displacing, national 
law as the source of private rights. This development has in tum 
produced a growing number of cases that cannot be decided without 
determining whether and to what extent Community law supersedes 
domestic law.8 
The draftsmen of the Treaties establishing the European Com-
munities no doubt intended to assure the supremacy of Community 
law on the domestic plane. For example, the Treaty Establishing 
the European Economic Community (EEC Treaty), which we shall 
take as our point of reference, empowers the Community that it 
establishes to enact legislation directly applicable within the Mem-
ber States.4 Many provisions of the Treaty, furthermore, are intended 
to create rights which are directly enforceable by individuals in the 
courts of the Member States.5 In addition, the Treaty requires na-
tional courts to seek the Community Court's ruling before finally 
deciding controversies involving the interpretation of the EEC 
Treaty or the validity and interpretation of Community legislation. 6 
3. A number of cases are now pending before the Constitutional Court of the Federal 
Republic of Germany in which the constitutionality of that country's adherence to the 
EEC Treaty is in issue. See Hopt, Report on Recent German Decisions, 4 COMMON 
MARKET L. REv. 93, 94.95 (1966). See also, Costa v. Ente Nazionale per !'Energia Elet-
trica, 87 Foro Italiano, pt. I, 465 (1964), 3 COMMON MARKET L. REP. 425 (1964) [herein-
after cited as Costa v. E.N.E.L.], where the Italian Constitutional Court concluded that 
an Italian law enacted subsequent to Italy's domestic promulgation of the EEC Treaty 
would supersede an inconsistent provision of that Treaty. This thesis was rejected, at 
least as a matter of Community law, by the Court of Justice of the European Commu-
nities in Costa v. E.N.E.L., Case No. 6/64, IO Sammlung der Rechtsprechung des Ge-
richtshofes [hereinafter cited as Sammlung] 1251, CCH COMMON MARKET REP. CT. 11 
8023 (1964). For an extensive discussion of this landmark case, sec Stein, supra note I. 
The Community Court's decision in the Costa case builds on two earlier cases: Hum-
blct v. Belgium, Case No. 6/60, 6 Sammlung 1163 (1960), reported by Buergenthal in 
56 AM. J. INT'L L. 540 (1962); N.V. Algemenc Transport-en Expeditic Onderneming 
Van Gcnd & Loos v. Netherlands Fiscal Administration, Case No. 26/62, 9 Sammlung 1, 
CCH Common Market Rep. Ct. 11 8008 (1963). The latter decision is analyzed by Riescn-
feld & Buxbaum, N.V. Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend r:r 
Loos v. Administration Fiscale Neerlandaise: A Pioneering Decision of the Court of 
Justice of the European Communities, 58 AM. J. !NT'L L. 152 (1964). 
4. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, art. 189 
[hereinafter cited as E.E.C. Treaty]. 
5. The Community Court has not as yet had the opportunity of authoritatively iden-
tifying all the Treaty provisions that arc likely to qualify as "self-executing" in nature 
pursuant to the test enunciated in the Costa and Van Gend b Loos cases. For a partial 
list of these provisions, see Hallstein, Zu den Grundlagen und Verfassungsprinzipien der 
europiiischen Gemeinschaften, in ZUR INTEGRATION EUROPAS I, 15 n.40 (Hallstein & 
Schlochauer eds. 1965). 
6. E.E.C. Treaty art. 177. Article 177 requires domestic courts of last resort to seek 
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This institutional scheme seeks to safeguard the uniform domestic 
application of the Treaty and of the law enacted pursuant to it, and 
thus presupposes that, in the event of a conflict between Community 
law and national law, the former will prevail. The Treaty does not, 
however, empower the Community Court to invalidate domestic 
legislation or to set aside domestic court decisions; nor does it contain 
an unambiguous supremacy clause from which such powers might be 
inferred.7 True, the Treaty does authorize the Community Court in 
actions instituted by the Community or by a Member State to find 
a State in default of the obligations that it has assumed by adhering 
to that instrument.8 However, this authorization does not always help 
a domestic judge to resolve a conflict between domestic law and the 
law of the Treaty: he may be told by the Community Court that the 
national law may not supersede Community law,9 and, at the same 
time, be faced with the provisions of his country's constitution which 
govern the domestic status of international agreements and which 
may compel the application of national law despite the fact that it 
conflicts with a provision of the Treaty, which, after all, is an inter-
national agreement.10 
The problem becomes even more complicated once it is realized 
that the domestic status of international agreements varies consider-
ably among the six Member States. In some of these States, treaties 
are accorded a normative rank equivalent to that of a statute and may 
therefore be superseded by later inconsistent domestic legislation11 
or be refused enforcement altogether if they conflict with the national 
constitution.12 In other Member States, international agreements 
such a "preliminary opinion" from the Court of Justice. It also empowers but does not 
require lower domestic courts to make this request. See generally Tomuschat, Die 
gerichtliche Verabentscheidung nach den Vertriigen uber die europiiischen Gemein-
schaften, BEIRTRAGE Zu.i.r Ausr.XNDISCHEN 6fjentlichen Recht und Vi:ilkerrecht No. 42 
(1964). 
7. The one provision which comes closest to being a supremacy clause is E.E.C. 
Treaty art. 189, which provides in part that Community "regulations [statutes of gen-
eral applicability] ••• shall be binding in every respect and directly in each Member 
State." 
8. E.E.C. Treaty arts. 169-71. 
9. See Costa v. E.N.E.L., 87 Foro Italiano, pt. I, 465, 3 COMMON MARKET L. REP. 
425 (1964). 
10. For the domestic status of international agreements in the six Member States, see 
BEDR, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF TIIE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 216-24 (1962); Stein, supra 
note 1, at 505-09. See generally Seidl-Hohenveldern, Transformation or Adoption of 
International Law Into Municipal Law, 12 INT'L &: COMP. L.Q. 88 (1963). 
11. This is true in Italy and in Germany. BEBR, op. cit. supra note 10, at 223; Men-
zel, Die Geltung intemationaler Vertriige im innerstaatlichen Recht, in DEUTSCIIE LAN-
DESREFERATE ZUM VI. INTERNATIONALEN KONGRESS FUR RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG 401, 412 
(Beiheft der RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 
1962). The same seems to be true in Belgium where this question has not as yet, how-
ever, been authoritatively settled. See Waelbroeck, Le juge belge devant le droit inter-
national et le droit communautaire, 2 REvuE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 348 (1965). 
12. The constitutionality of international agreements and statutes may be challenged 
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take precedence over all prior and subsequent domestic legislation, 
but even in these states, treaties may in turn be superseded by later 
inconsistent treaties.13 It is thus apparent that, if the EEC Treaty 
and the law promulgated pursuant to it are accorded the same nor-
mative rank on the domestic plane that other international agree-
ments enjoy, conflicts may arise which national judges will in some 
cases have to resolve against the application of Community law. Such 
a result would "shake the very foundations of the Treaty."14 If, on 
the other hand, it can be shown that it is erroneous to equate Com-
munity law with conventional international law, it would be possi-
ble to contend that the domestic application of the Treaty should be 
governed by rules other than those traditionally invoked to resolve 
conflicts between national law and treaty law. The book under review 
furnishes the conceptual basis for this latter approach. 
Professor Hay starts with the premise that an analysis of the func-
tions which the Treaty assigns to the Community in relation to its 
Member States is the key to an understanding of the legal nature of 
the Community and its law. Such an analysis reveals, in his opinion, 
the federal character of the Community and its law. This character-
ization assumes that the Treaty, to the extent that it empowers the 
Community to exercise its functions free from domestic law inter-
ference, has endowed the organization with federal law-making 
powers to promulgate Community law that has a directly binding 
and a pre-emptive effect within the Member States. The existence of 
these powers can only be explained, so the argument runs, by recog-
nizing that the Member States have transferred to the Community 
those sovereign powers which they previously possessed over the sub-
stantive areas now covered by the Treaty. It is in "the concept of a 
transfer of sovereignty" that "the legal-analytic counterpart of the 
political-descriptive notion of supranationalism" is to be found 
(p. 69). 
To reach this conclusion, Professor Hay rejects the traditional 
notion that sovereignty is an inalienable attribute of statehood. Sov-
ereignty to him is a "collection of powers." "The possession of these 
powers as a sum, either with respect to a given populace, or territory, 
or substantive area of activity, or all, may be shared by two or more 
institutions, or states or a combination of them." Thus understood, 
in Germany and Italy, but not in Belgium whose courts lack the power of judicial re-
view. See authorities cited note 11 supra. 
13. This is the case in the Netherlands, Luxembourg and apparently also in France. 
For the Netherlands, see Van Panhuys, The Netherland Constitution and International 
Law: A Decade of Experience, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 88 (1964); for Luxembourg, see Pesca-
tore, CONCLUSION ET EFFET DES TRAITES INTERNATIONAUX 105-07 (1964); for France, see 
Lagrange, La Primautt! du Droit Communautaire sur le Droit National, in BRUGES, 
COI.LEGE D'EUROPE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 21, 33-42. 
14. Conclusions of Advocate General Lagrange, Costa v. E.N.E.L., 10 Sammlung 
1279, 1291, CCH Coll!ll!ON MARKET REP. CT. ,f 8023, at 7394, 7398 (1964). 
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sovereignty is divisible and "since a given state presumably has the 
totality of sovereign powers applicable to it initially, the sharing in 
this sum by other states or institutions will be accomplished by a 
transfer of some of these powers" (p. 70). In the substantive areas to 
which the Treaty applies, if one accepts the transfer-of-sovereignty 
thesis, the Community possesses both "external" sovereignty and in-
ternal pre-emptive jurisdiction, or, as Professor Hay would put it, 
"supreme power over the specific subject matter" that was trans-
ferred. He illustrates this proposition by showing that "a transfer to 
the Common Market of national jurisdiction in the field of commer-
cial policy substitutes EEC jurisdiction for that of th,e member states 
for purposes of the internal law of the Community; it also substitutes 
. . . the Community for the members as the proper party in dealings 
with third states in the international legal community" (p. 72). 
According to Professor Hay, this transfer of sovereign powers fur-
nishes the conceptual basis for the resolution of conflicts on the do-
mestic plane between national law and Community law in favor of 
the latter. "The assumption of a transfer of sovereign powers to the 
Community requires the conclusion that the legitimation for any 
given norm of Community law in the substantive areas in which 
powers were transferred cannot be sought any longer in national 
constitutional law." Because the Treaty is "the ultimate legitimation 
for Community law . . . it has replaced national law as the legitima-
tion for the given substantive norm." From this "it follows that na-
tional law which is inconsistent with the Community norm must 
yield, because it lacks, by definition, constitutional legitimation" 
(p. 181). The transfer of sovereign powers does not, in Mr. Hay's 
view, deprive the Member States of legislative power over the sub-
stantive areas that were transferred. This would be to confuse legiti-
mation with legislative competence, and would be difficult to recon-
cile with the Treaty which, with regard to many questions, either 
merely authorizes future pre-emption by Community law or contem-
plates the exercise of concurrent legislative jurisdiction. As a matter 
of fact, "it is in this allocation of jurisdiction between two systems 
(Community and national), rather than in the shift in toto from one 
to the other, that the federal principle is realized" (p. 184). 
The proposition that the Member States by adhering to the Com-
munity Treaties have relinquished the soverign powers necessary to 
deny the internal supremacy of Community law is not new. Its articu-
lation is usually ascribed to Professor Carl Friedrich Ophiils,15 who 
represented West Germany in the negotiations leading to the estab-
lishment of the EEC and served as legal adviser to the German dele-
gation during the drafting of the ECSC Treaty. Ophiils' view enjoys 
15. Ophiils, Quellen und Aufbau des Europiiischen Gemeinschaftsrechts, 16 NEUE 
JURISTISCHE WocHENSCHRIFr 1697 (1963). 
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considerable scholarly support in Europe,16 although it has equally 
respectable critics even in Germany17 whose constitution,18 by ex-
pressly authorizing the transfer of sovereign powers to international 
organizations, invites the argument that the Community Treaties 
have in fact accomplished such a transfer. It would, however, belittle 
the actual value of Mr. Hay's study to say that he has made the most 
persuasive case yet in support of the view which Ophiils has only 
asserted, although that in itself is a considerable accomplishment. On 
the contrary, the real contribution of the book, in addition to its ex-
tremely thorough analysis of the "federal" structure of the Commu-
nities and of the constitutional problems inherent in such structure, 
is to be found in Professor Hay's imaginative modification of Ophiils' 
thesis. Ophiils assumes that the transfer of sovereign powers to the 
Communities extinguished whatever law-making powers the Mem-
ber States possessed over the substantive areas that were transferred. 
He therefore denies that conflicts between Community law and na-
tional law pose conceptual problems, since if the national legislature 
lacks the power to legislate in the substantive areas regulated by the 
Treaties, a domestic law encroaching thereon is ipso facto a nullity.19 
This is an appealing argument. It is not, however, compatible with 
the pre-emption-oriented scheme of the Community Treaties. Pro-
fessor Hay's conclusion-that the transfer of sovereign powers has 
merely shifted to the Communities the power of constitutional legiti-
mation in the areas transferred which the Member States previously 
enjoyed-assures the desired Community law supremacy without dis-
torting the "federal" scheme of the Treaties. It also avoids the un-
tenable assumption, which is implicit in Ophiils' approach, that dur-
ing the long period of transition from partial to total Community 
law pre-emption there must exist a legislative vacuum which the 
states may not fill. 
It must, of course, be recognized that Professor Hay's conclusion 
that the Community Treaties have effected a transfer of sovereign 
powers is one of a number of possible theories that might reasonably 
be advanced. That is to say, the Treaties permit the assumption that 
16. See, e.g., Lagrange, supra note 13, at 23-26. 
17. See Ipsen, Das Verhiiltnis des Rechts der europiiischen Gemeinschaften zum 
nationalen Recht, in Aktuelle Fragen, supra note 2, at 1, who identifies four distinct 
German approaches to this question and concludes that Ophiils' views are by no means 
representative of German scholarly opinion. Id. at 8. 
18. GRUNDGESETZ art. 24(1) provides: "The Federation may, by legislation, transfer 
sovereign powers to international organizations." Similar, but by no means as explicit, 
provisions for the transfer of sovereign powers may be found in the constitutions of the 
Netherlands (art. 67), Italy (art. 11), Luxembourg (art. 49 bis). 
It should be noted, however, that even in Germany it is by no means clear that 
article 24 of the Grundgesetz permits the transferee to exercise the powers that were 
transferred free from the restraints of the constitution. See Ehle, Verfassungskontrolle 
und Gemeinschaftsrecht, 17 NEUE JURISTISCHE WoCHENsCHIUFT 321 (1964). 
19. Ophiils, supra note 15, at 1699 n.10. 
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such a transfer has occurred, but they do not compel that conclusion. 
One could contend, for example, that the Member States have merely 
assumed an international obligation to remove all constitutional 
obstacles interfering with the domestic implementation of Commu-
nity law, and that such an undertaking cannot, without the requisite 
constitutional revisions, empower national courts to disregard do-
mestic constitutional imperatives. As a practical matter, however, 
these internal legal obtacles could not always be overcome as rapidly 
as the uniform application of Community law demands. To the 
extent that the thesis advanced by Professor Hay provides a sound 
conceptual basis for the domestic implementation of Community law 
free from these troublesome constitutional impediments, it serves 
useful purposes: it assures a smooth and orderly evolution of Com-
munity law, and, what may well be more important, it enables those 
European judges who find themselves increasingly hard pressed to 
explain and sustain the internal supremacy of Community law to 
achieve a result to which their governments are politically com-
mitted. Whether they will choose this road is ultimately a political 
rather than a legal question. 
Thomas Buergenthal, 
Associate Professor of Law, 
State University of New York 
at Buffalo School of Law 
